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Abstract
In this thesis, I analyze individuals’ mode choice decisions and shopping mall’s parking
space pricing behavior. Individuals have three choices: first they may come to the mall by
car in which case they have to park, second they may come by public transportation, or they
do not visit the mall and go for their outside option. The mall determines the price of the
good and the parking fee after the government sets public transportation fare. I find that the
equilibrium parking fees are always less than the marginal cost of providing parking spaces
and more importantly they are two of the many parking fees that lead to the social optimum.
The mall can be thought as using parking as a loss leader to increase its profits, and implicitly
employing mixed bundling in which the good is sold either alone or bundled with parking.
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TU¨REL DAG˘ILIM VE ALIS¸VERI˙S¸ MERKEZI˙ PARKLANMASI
Fulya Yu¨ksel Ersoy
Ekonomi Yu¨ksek Lisans Tezi, 2012
Tez Danıs¸manı: Eren I˙nci
Anahtar Kelimeler: Karıs¸ık Paketleme; Tu¨rel Dag˘ılım; Zarar Lideri; Park Yeri U¨creti;
Alıs¸veris¸ Merkezi.
O¨zet
Bu tezde, tu¨keticilerin tu¨rel dag˘ılım kararları ve alıs¸veris¸ merkezinin park yeri fiyat-
lama davranıs¸ı analiz edilmektedir. Sunulan modelde, tu¨keticiler u¨c¸ sec¸eneg˘e sahiptirler:
alıs¸veris¸ merkezine arabalarıyla (ki bu durumda park etmek zorundalar) veya toplu tas¸ıma
arac¸ları ile gelebilmektedirler; ya da alıs¸veris¸ merkezine gelmeyip kendilerine fayda sag˘layan
dig˘er sec¸enekleri deg˘erlendirebilmektedirler. Devlet, toplu tas¸ıma arac¸larının u¨cretlerini be-
lirledikten sonra alıs¸veris¸ merkezi, sattıg˘ı u¨ru¨nu¨n fiyatını ve park yeri u¨cretini belirlemekte-
dir. Dengede, park yeri u¨cretleri her zaman park yeri sag˘lamanın marjinal maliyetinden daha
ku¨c¸u¨k olmaktadırlar. Daha da o¨nemlisi dengede bulunan park yeri u¨cretleri toplum ac¸ısından
en iyi olan park yeri u¨cretlerindendir. Alıs¸veris¸ merkezinin park yeri u¨creti sec¸imi, zarar lid-
eri fiyatlandırması, ve u¨ru¨nu¨n hem park yeri ile birlikte hem de ayrı olarak sunulması, bir
karıs¸ık paketleme uygulaması olarak du¨s¸u¨nu¨lebilmektedir.
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1 Introduction
This paper focuses on shopping mall parking behavior when shoppers have two alternative
modes of reaching the mall. They can either come to the mall by car or by public transporta-
tion. I analyze the equilibrium and socially optimal parking fees through a set of different
variations of the model. The main contribution of the paper is to show that the equilibrium
parking fees should be less than the marginal cost of providing parking spaces in all variations
I worked out. The products which are sold at prices below their marginal cost to boost other
profitable sales are called loss leaders. Thus, the mall uses parking spaces as ”loss leaders”.
Parking is one of the most important intermediate goods in the economy but economists
did not pay enough attention on the issue until early 1990s. After then, there have been
increasing number of papers on parking, which I discuss in Section 2. One of the most
important providers of parking spaces are shopping malls. Shopping malls allocate more
space for parking than they allocate for shops (International Council of Shopping Centers
and Urban Land Institute, 2003). The same report also states that 94% of the shopping malls
provide parking for free.
To my knowledge, Hasker and Inci (2012) are the first to analyze the shopping mall
parking behavior. They show why suburban malls provide parking for free even though they
allocate vast amount of land for parking and why that may also be socially optimal in a
second-best sense. In their model, shoppers can reach the mall only by car and they may
end up leaving the mall empty-handed when they do not find their desired good at the mall.
To insure the shoppers against this bad outcome to some extent, the mall provides parking
for free. Thus, the insurance motive of the risk-neutral mall leads it to embed the costs of
parking into the price of the good sold at the mall. They, then, extend the model to a setting
in which the mall decides on the parking lot size as well as the parking fee, and again they
find zero equilibrium parking fee. They also analyze what might happen in urban malls in
which individuals who have no intention of shopping at the mall may want to free ride on the
mall’s parking lot if it is provided for free. The mall wants to charge for their parking while
it wants to provide some ”insurance” to the shoppers. Thus, in this case, if the potential free
riders are sufficiently large, the mall may give up providing parking for free.
There are two main differences between my paper and Hasker and Inci (2012). The first
main difference is that there is mode choice in my setting. The shoppers may either come
by car or public transportation. There are both empirical and theoretical works on mode
choice which motivate me to investigate the effects of mode choice on the shopping mall
parking behavior. First, there is strong empirical evidence that some shoppers prefer public
transportation to reach the mall. For example, a survey conducted at selected sub-urban
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shopping malls in Singapore reveals that among 1283 shoppers who respond the survey;
63% prefer public transportation, 17% prefer walking and the remaining 20% rely on private
transportation (Ooi and Sim, 2007).
Second, there are theoretical papers on mode choice. As far as I know, Voith (1998) is the
first to discuss the interplay between parking, transportation, and land use. Its main interest is
to analyze the effects of parking taxes and transit subsidies on the equilibrium size of central
business district (CBD), the land values of CBD and modal shares. Although the main interest
of my paper is quite different, the modelling of individuals and their commuting choices have
similarities with Voith (1998). Voith assumes that a worker has two modes to access the
CBD: automobile and transit, auto use results in congestion whereas transit use does not. In
his base model, the district is assumed to have an unlimited supply of parking spaces, then
he discusses an extension of the model in which supply of parking spaces is endogenously
determined. He finds a non-monotonic relationship (the Laffer Curve) between parking taxes
and transit use. Also, Arnott and Yan (2000) and Kraus (2003) work on ”two-mode problem”
which I discuss in details in Section 2.
The second difference of my model from Hasker and Inci (2012) is that shoppers in my
model always find the good that they want at the mall. This assumption is mainly due to shut
down the insurance motive of the mall in order to highlight the pure effects of introducing
public transportation to the model. I find that in the absence of the insurance motive, depend-
ing on parameters, the mall either provides parking for free or charges a positive parking fee.
However, the equilibrium parking fees are always less than the marginal cost of providing
parking spaces. Hence, even in the absence of the insurance motive the mall embeds some of
the costs of parking into the price of the good.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3
sets up the model and derives the equilibrium as well as the social optimum. Section 4 relaxes
some of the assumptions of the model and analyzes how the equilibrium and social optimum
change. Section 5 relates the paper to the industrial organization literature on bundling and
loss leaders. Section 6 concludes. An appendix contains some details and proofs.
2 Literature Review
The parking literature mainly focuses on the pricing of parking. Early work analyzes the
relation between parking fees and road pricing. Glazer and Niskanen (1992) construct a
model in which two types of drivers exist: parkers, who park downtown, and through-drivers,
who drive through downtown. The parking duration and the demand for parking spaces are
endogenous. They consider both lump-sum and duration-specific parking fees. They analyze
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the first-best and find that duration-specific parking fees should be equal to the marginal cost
of providing parking spaces and lump-sum parking fees should be zero. They also analyze
the second-best in which the road usage fee is suboptimally set and find that there should be
a positive lump-sum parking fee in addition to duration specific parking fee which is equal
to the marginal cost of providing parking spaces. When there are search costs, increasing
parking fees may increase congestion by shortening parking duration.
Verhoef, Nijkamp, and Rietveld (1995) discuss regulatory parking policies as a substitute
for road pricing. The authors believe that parking policies can only be effective if the costs
of driving do not heavily depend on trip lengths and routes followed. These policies are good
at alleviating congestion externalities on urban roads. They compare two forms of parking
policies: pricing parking and restricting its supply. They find that time-varying parking fees
are preferable to the parking suppy restrictions when parking policies are equivalent to road
pricing. Then, they analyze spatially differentiated parking fees and find that under certain
assumptions these fees surmount the difficulty that the regulatory parking policies cannot be
differentiated according to trip lengths.
Arnott, de Palma, and Lindsey (1991) develop a model that incorporates the travel time
(temporal) and location of parking spot (spatial) decisions of commuters. They first analyze
the equilibrium with no road tolls and no parking fees. This equilibrium is inefficient in
many respects and this inefficiency is due to the uninternalized externalities of commuters.
They, then, analyze the cases in which there are time-varying road tolls but not parking fees,
there are time-varying road tolls and parking fees, and there are location specific parking
fees but not road tolls. The first case eliminates some of the inefficiencies and the second
one eliminates all of them. But, since the applicability of road tolls in real life is somehow
problematic, the authors also consider the third case. In all these cases, they assume that
parking is in the hands of public sector. By relaxing this assumption and assuming private
provision of parking, they analyze the equilibrium price of parking in a perfectly competitive
environment. They find that without road tolls competitive pricing of parking may be worse
than no pricing at all.
There is a growing body of papers studying the effects of congestion externalities on
parking fees. Arnott and Rowse (1999) present a stochastic model of parking around a cir-
cular road in which drivers cause a parking congestion externality on other drivers since they
do not take into account the effect of their parking on the mean density of empty parking
spaces. For simplicity, the authors do not incorporate flow congestion into the model. There
are two travel modes available to individuals, namely walking and driving. The individu-
als should decide which travel offers to accept, which mode of transportation to use and the
cruising distance. Stochastic nature of finding a parking space complicates the analysis, but it
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is necessary since there would be no cruising without stochasticity. The authors characterize
the equilibrium solution with no parking fees as well as with parking fees, and the social
optimum. They find that the optimal parking fee should be equal to the parking congestion
externality.
Anderson and de Palma (2004) first analyze a model of unassigned parking in which a
parker increases the search time of other parkers in the same area, but does not slow down the
traffic in general. They look at the equilibrium with unpriced parking, the social optimum,
and the pricing of parking by monopolistically competitive private lot operators. They show
that pricing parking in a monopolistically competitive fashion achieves the social optimum.
They, then, analyze a model in which both the search externality and the cruising congestion
externality exist. They find that market solution can no longer decentralize the social opti-
mum. Their model can be interpreted as a model of on-street parking or off-street parking.
Anderson and de Palma (2007) extend the model of Anderson and de Palma (2004) by al-
lowing endogenous land use. They show once again that the social optimum is achieved in a
monopolistically competitive parking market.
There are also papers focusing on cruising for parking. Arnott and Inci (2006) analyze
the interaction between traffic congestion and curbside parking in a structural model in which
cruising for parking is a source of traffic congestion. They are interested in finding the steady
states when the parking is saturated (fully occupied). A car cruising for parking in their
setting contributes to the traffic at least as much as a car in transit. In equilibrium, there
is cruising for parking. They also analyze the first-best steady-state social optimum when
the amount of curbside allocated for parking is fixed and variable. They find that cruising
for parking creates a pure deadweight loss and the parking fee (or the amount of curbside
allocated for parking when the parking fee is fixed) should be set such that the cruising for
parking is eliminated without making parking unsaturated.
Shoup (2006) analyzes off-street parking, and its relation with curbside parking and cruis-
ing congestion externalities. He explains possible factors that can affect the decision of
drivers on choosing between curbside parking and off-street parking. He predicts that drivers
will be more likely to cruise if the curbside parking fee is low, the off-street parking fee is
high, the parking duration is long, the fuel cost of cruising is low, there are few individuals
in the car, and the value of time spent for cruising is low. Shoup presents a simple model and
finds that underpriced curbside parking results in cruising for parking and it does not change
the utility of drivers, but makes everyone else in the community worse off. The model also
predicts that equating the curbside parking fee to the off-street parking fee eliminates cruising
for parking.
Arnott and Rowse (2009) analyze the interactions between traffic congestion, curbside
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parking, and off-street parking (specifically, private garage parking) by extending the model
provided in Arnott and Inci (2006). They first analyze the case in which garage parking
is provided competitively and curbside parking is underpriced. The equilibrium condition
requires that the stock of cars cruising for parking should be such that the full prices of
curbside and off-street parking are equal. Then, the authors analyze a more complex case
in which parking garages have a market power due to horizontal economies of scale and
there is spatial competition among garages, which may lead to inefficient spacing of garage
parking. They find that in equilibrium the parking garage fee is above the marginal cost
and the parking garages are too close to each other. For tractability reasons, they assume
that demand is inelastic. They ignore capacity constraints of garages since these constraints
complicate the analysis a lot.
My paper is also related to the two-mode problem. Arnott and Yan (2000) construct a par-
tial equilibrium model of two-mode travel (car and rail) in which two congestible modes are
imperfect substitutes in demand. They first discuss the Wheaton and Wilson problem, which
analyzes the optimal road width when there is only one mode and the congestion on this mode
is underpriced. They, then, discuss the Doi problem, which analyzes the optimal pricing of
one mode when the other mode is underpriced. Finally, they try to analyze the (second-best)
optimal road width, rail fare, and rail capacity when road congestion is underpriced. To solve
this problem, they mostly adopt a local approach in which comparative static properties of
the problem are derived; however, the results are too complex and they are interpretable only
for some specific cases.
Kraus (2003) constructs a model of the two-mode problem by combining a rail line model
with a highway bottleneck model. He solves for the equilibrium, the first-best and the second-
best. His paper is similar to Arnott and Yan (2000) in the sense that it analyzes the second-best
optimal rail price and rail capacity when the road is underpriced. It differs from Arnott and
Yan (2000) in that it focuses on the relationship between the first-best and the second-best
levels of rail capacity. Kraus finds that under some elasticity conditions, lowering transit fares
and scheduling more trains with higher capacity are desirable when road travel is underpriced.
One of the earliest empirical papers in the literature that analyzes the effects of parking
fees on mode choice decision is Estimation and Specification of the Effects of Parking Costs
on Urban Transport Mode Choice by Gillen (1977). Although the main concern of this paper
is to estimate the parameters of specified models of mode choice by using a binary logit
estimation, it also offers insights about the relationship between parking and mode choice.
Gillen estimates the effects of parking costs and auto running costs separately. Then, he
concludes that the impact of the former on the mode choice decision is greater than the
impact of the latter, and this is true even when he considers income effects. In his model,
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a change in parking fees both affects the parking location and mode choice. In my model,
parking fees and mode choice endogenously affect each other.
3 The Model
I start off with describing the base model and its assumptions. There is a shopping mall that
is owned and operated by a monopolist, risk-neutral shopping mall owner. The mall sells
one good, which has no cost, at a non-negative price of P . There are two ways of reaching
the mall: by car or by public transportation. The mall provides parking spaces for shoppers
coming by car. Providing parking spaces is costly for the mall and this cost is denoted by c
> 0 per unit of parking space. The parking fee charged by the mall is t. Both P and t are
common knowledge and the mall decides on them.
There is also a (local) government which is in charge of the public transportation system.
The government decides on the public transportation fare, s, by taking into account the wel-
fare of all parties in society. I also discuss two other possibilities in terms of how the fare for
this transportation mode can be determined. In Subsection 4.1, I consider a case in which the
mall provides shuttle bus service and in Subsection 4.2, I consider a case in which this mode
of transportation is provided privately by a profit-maximizing third party. Providing public
transportation is costless for the government in the base model, but I relax this assumption in
Subsection 4.3.
There is a mass Nˆ of risk-neutral individuals who live in a certain neighborhood and they
commute to the mall by one of the transportation modes discussed above. Thus, I assume
that there is a common origin and destination. Individuals may choose to stay at home rather
than coming to the mall, in which case they get r > 0 which is the reservation value of not
coming to the mall. Each shopper purchases one and only one unit of the good sold by the
mall. The value of the good to a shopper is v, which has the cumulative distribution function
F (v) with support [0; v¯] and the probability density function f(v) > 0. I assume that F (v)
has the standard monotone hazard rate property or that f(v)/[1− F (v)] is increasing.
Since the shoppers are risk-neutral, the utility of a shopper coming by car is v−P − t−k,
where k > 0 represents the fuel cost of shoppers coming to the mall by car, while the utility
of a shopper coming by public transportation is v − P − s − d(N), where N represents the
number of shoppers coming by public transportation.1 Here, d(N) represents the disutility of
shoppers coming by public transportation and it is assumed that this disutility function has the
convex form of d(N) = aN2, where a is a positive constant. I analyze the model with a more
general d(N) in Subsection 4.4. There is strong evidence showing that comfort is one of the
1Similar to Voith (1998), I abstract from the issues of fixed costs related to car ownership.
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main factors affecting commuting preferences of individuals (See, for example, Lisco (1968),
Joireman et al. (1997), Steg (2003), and Haywood and Koning (2011)). Hence, I think that
incorporating this disutility function into the model is both appropriate and necessary.
Overall, the model can be thought as a sequential game with three players. First, the
government determines the public transportation fare s. After observing the behavior of the
government, the mall decides on the good price P , and the parking fee t. After observing the
choices of the government and the mall, the individuals choose from the following alterna-
tives: staying at home, coming to the mall by car or by public transportation.
3.1 Equilibrium
In this subsection, I determine the equilibrium parking fee, the equilibrium price of the good
and the equilibrium transportation fare. Because the model is sequential, I start from the last
stage of the game and apply backward induction.
3.1.1 The problem of the individuals
First, I need to solve the problem of the individuals. An individual will come to the shopping
mall by car if his utility of coming by car is greater than his utility of coming by public
transportation, i.e., v − P − t − k > v − P − s − d(N), and if his utility of coming by car
is greater than or equal to his utility of staying at home, i.e., v − P − t − k ≥ r. Similarly,
an individual will come to the mall by public transportation if his utility of coming by public
transportation is greater than his utility of coming by car, i.e., v−P−s−d(N) > v−P−t−k,
and if his utility of coming by public transportation is greater than or equal to his utility of
staying at home, i.e., v − P − s − d(N) ≥ r. An individual will be indifferent between
coming by car or by public transportation if his utility of coming by car is equal to his utility
of coming by public transportation and this utility is greater than or equal to his utility of
staying at home, i.e., v − P − t− k = v − P − s− d(N) ≥ r.
In an equilibrium; F (v˜)Nˆ individuals stay at home where v˜ is the value that makes indi-
viduals indifferent between staying at home and coming to the mall and v˜ = P + t + k + r,
N∗ individuals come by public transportation where N∗ is the number of individuals coming
by public trasportation that makes shoppers indifferent between coming by car and coming
by public transportation and N∗ = d−1(t + k − s) = √(t + k − s)/a, and the remaining
(1− F (v˜))Nˆ −N∗ individuals come by car.2
2Notice that I do not consider the cases where s and t are determined such that t+ k < s+ d(N) for all N
or t + k > s + d(N) for all N since my aim is to analyze the shopping mall behavior in determining P and t
when some of the shoppers come by public transportation and some of them come by car. If there is an interior
solution of the problem, there will be an N∗ that satisfies t + k = s + d(N∗). For the analysis of the cases in
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Notice that the mode choice of shoppers is independent of the value of the good. That is I
cannot claim that shoppers with high valuations of the good come by car and those with low
valuations by public transportation, or vice versa. Hence, I can only determine how many
shoppers choose to come by public transportation and how many of them by car; I cannot
determine who chooses to come by public transportation and who by car.
3.1.2 The problem of the mall
After solving the problem of the individuals, I need to deal with the problem of the mall. The
objective of the mall is to maximize its profit, Π(P, t):
Π(P, t) = PN∗ + (P + t− c)[(1− F (v˜))Nˆ −N∗] , (1)
subject to the rationality constraint P + t − c ≥ 0 and the non-negativity constraint P ≥ 0.
The first-order conditions with respect to P and t are
ΠP : (1− F (P + t + k + r))Nˆ − (P + t− c)f(P + t + k + r)Nˆ (2)
Πt : (1− F (P + t + k + r))Nˆ − (P + t− c)f(P + t + k + r)Nˆ
− t− c
2a
√
t+k−s
a
−
√
t + k − s
a
,
respectively. Equating the first-order condition with respect to P , ΠP , to zero implicitly gives
the equilibrium price of the good, Peq:
Peq =
1− F (v˜)
f(v˜)
− t + c . (3)
If both first-order conditions are zero, then I will have√
t + k − s
a
+
t− c
2a
√
t+k−s
a
= 0 . (4)
Equation (4) implies that t ≤ c and leads to the equilibrium parking fee, teq:
teq =
c + 2s− 2k
3
. (5)
which an interior solution is not possible (i.e., the cases where t+k < s+d(N) for all N or t+k > s+d(N)
for all N ), see Appendix A.1.
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The problem of the mall has a unique interior maximum.3
3.1.3 The problem of the government
Having solved the problem of the individuals and the mall, I can now analyze the problem of
the government. The government maximizes the total welfare of all members in society by
choosing a public transportation fare s. Thus, its objective function is, Y (s), is given by
Y (s) = rNˆF (v˜) + E[v − P − t− k][Nˆ −N∗ − NˆF (v˜)] (6)
+ E[v − P − s− d(N∗)]N∗ + PN∗ + (P + t− c)[(1− F (v˜))Nˆ −N∗]
+ sN∗ .
When determining s, the government should take into account the effects of its decision on
the pricing behavior of the mall. Thus, it should consider two cases: case 1 in which the
equilibrium public transportation fare leads to an equilibrium parking fee which is less than
or equal to zero and case 2 in which the equilibrium public transportation fare leads to a
positive equilibrium parking fee. Now, I analyze these two cases in turn and determine which
one occurs in equilibrium.
Case 1: The public transportation fare s determined by the government results in a park-
ing fee of t such that t ≤ 0. Then, because choosing a negative parking fee is not practically
implementable, the mall chooses t = 0 and determines the price of the good P accordingly.
By using t = 0 and equation (3), the mall finds the equilibrium price of the good:
Peq case1 =
1− F (v˜)
f(v˜)
+ c . (7)
By substituting equation (7) and t = 0 in equation (6), I get
Y case1 = rNˆF (v˜) + [(
∫ v¯
v˜
vf(v)dv)− 1− F (v˜)
f(v˜)
− c− k][Nˆ − NˆF (v˜)] (8)
+ (
1− F (v˜)
f(v˜)
+ c)
√
k − s
a
+
1− F (v˜)
f(v˜)
[(1− F (v˜))Nˆ −
√
k − s
a
]
+ s
√
k − s
a
.
Notice that v˜ = P + t + k + r = [1 − F (v˜)]/f(v˜) + c + k + r does not contain s. The
3See Appendix A.2 for the proof.
9
first-order condition with respect to s is
Y case1s : −
c + s
2a
√
k−s
a
+
√
k − s
a
. (9)
If this first-order condition is equal to zero, then I will have the equilibrium transportation
fare, seq case1:
seq case1 =
2k − c
3
≥ 0 , (10)
which is the maximizer of the problem of the government for case 1.4
Case 2: The public transportation fare s determined by the government results in a park-
ing fee of t such that t > 0. Then, the mall chooses t = (c + 2s− 2k)/3 and determines the
price of the good P accordingly. By using t = (c + 2s − 2k)/3 and equation (3), the mall
finds the equilibrium price of the good:
Peq case2 =
1− F (v˜)
f(v˜)
+
2(c + k − s)
3
. (11)
By substituting equation (11) and t = (c + 2s− 2k)/3 in equation (6), I get
Y case2 = rNˆF (v˜) + [(
∫ v¯
v˜
vf(v)dv)− 1− F (v˜)
f(v˜)
− c− k][Nˆ − NˆF (v˜)] (12)
+ [
1− F (v˜)
f(v˜)
+
2(c + k − s)
3
]
√
c + k − s
3a
+
1− F (v˜)
f(v˜)
[(1− F (v˜))Nˆ −
√
c + k − s
3a
] + s
√
c + k − s
3a
.
Notice that v˜ = P + t+k+r = [1−F (v˜)]/f(v˜)+2(c+k−s)/3+(c+2s−2k)/3+k+r =
[1−F (v˜)]/f(v˜) + c+ k + r does not contain s. The first-order condition with respect to s is
Y case2s : −
2c+2k+s
3
6a
√
c+k−s
3a
+
1
3
√
c + k − s
3a
. (13)
If this first-order condition is equal to zero, then I will have the equilibrium transportation
fare, seq case2:
seq case2 = 0 , (14)
4See Appendix A.3 for the proof.
10
which is the maximizer of the problem of the government for case 2.4
Having analyzed the two possible cases, I now compare the value of objective functions
Y case1 and Y case2 so that I can understand which of these cases happens in equilibrium. By
substituting the relevant prices, parking fees and transportation fares, I find that
Y case1 = y +
2c + 2k
3
√
c + k
3a
(15)
Y case2 = y +
2c + 2k
3
√
c + k
3a
,
where y = rNˆF (v˜) + [(
∫ v¯
v˜
vf(v)dv) − (1 − F (v˜))/f(v˜) − c − k][Nˆ − NˆF (v˜)] + [(1 −
F (v˜))2Nˆ ]/f(v˜) and v˜ = [1−F (v˜)]/f(v˜)+c+k+r. This comparison shows that the welfare
of society in the first case is equal to the welfare of society in the second case. Hence, the
government is indifferent between choosing the public transportation fare which leads to case
1 and the public transportation fare which leads to case 2.
3.1.4 The equilibrium solution
If the government chooses public tranportation fare seq case1 = (2k − c)/3 ≥ 0, then the
mall in turn will choose the equilibrium parking fee teq case1 = 0 and the equilibrium good
price Peq case1 = [1− F (v˜)]/f(v˜) + c. Then N∗ =
√
(c + k)/3a individuals come by public
transportation. If the government chooses public tranportation fare seq case2 = 0, then the mall
in turn will choose the equilibrium parking fee teq case2 = (c−2k)/3 > 0 and the equilibrium
good price Peq case2 = [1−F (v˜)]/f(v˜) + (2c+ 2k)/3. Then, once again N∗ =
√
(c + k)/3a
individuals come by public transportation.5 Notice that which of the above equilibria occurs
depends on the model parameters. I summarize these findings in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 If c ≤ 2k, then the government will choose a non-negative public transporta-
tion fare and the mall will prefer free provision of parking. If c > 2k, then the government
will prefer free provision of public transportation and the mall will choose (c− 2k)/3 > 0 as
the equilibrium parking fee. Furthermore, the equilibrium parking fees are always less than
the marginal cost of providing parking spaces.
The mall faces a trade-off between attracting more individuals and charging higher prices
both for the good and parking. In equilibrium, the mall chooses to provide parking at a price
that is below the marginal cost of providing it. The reason for this result is that as long as
5Notice that changing the value of a here only changes the modal split but not the total number of individuals
who visit the shopping mall.
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the parking fee is above the marginal cost of providing parking spaces, decreasing parking
fee will result in positive marginal profits for the mall since the mall can earn more profits
both by charging higher prices for the good without affecting the total number of individuals
buying the good and by collecting parking fees from more shoppers. If the marginal cost of
providing parking spaces is small enough, then the mall will prefer free provision of parking
since its marginal profit is greater than or equal to zero when parking is provided for free.
However, if the marginal cost of providing parking spaces is high, then the mall will choose
a positive parking fee since its marginal profit is equal to zero at this parking fee. Thus, the
mall embeds at least some of the costs of parking into the price of the good sold at the mall
and use parking as a loss leader to increase the price of the good.
I still need to check whether the non-negativity and rationality constraints hold or not.
Both for case 1 and case 2, one can simply see that the equilibrium price of the good is
always greater than zero and Peq + teq − c = [1− F (v˜)]/f(v˜) > 0; so both constraints hold
in equilibrium.
3.2 The Socially Optimal Solution
The next question to ask is whether a social planner, who maximizes the welfare of society,
agrees with the equilibrium solution or not. The problem of the social planner is to maximize
the welfare of society, Y (P, t, s) :
Y (P, t, s) = rNˆF (v˜) + E[v − P − t− k][Nˆ −N∗ − NˆF (v˜)] (16)
+ E[v − P − s− d(N∗)]N∗ + PN∗ + (P + t− c)[(1− F (v˜))Nˆ −N∗]
+ sN∗ ,
by simultaneously choosing P , t and s. The first-order conditions of the problem are
YP : Nˆf(v˜)[r −
∫ v¯
v˜
vf(v)dv + k + c]− [Nˆ − NˆF (v˜)]f(v˜)v˜ (17)
Yt : Nˆf(v˜)[r −
∫ v¯
v˜
vf(v)dv + k + c]− [Nˆ − NˆF (v˜)]f(v˜)v˜
− t− c− s
2a
√
t+k−s
a
−
√
t + k − s
a
Ys :
t− c− s
2a
√
t+k−s
a
+
√
t + k − s
a
.
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Equating the first-order conditions with respect to P and t to zero gives the socially optimal
parking fee, topt, for an interior solution:
topt =
3s + c− 2k
3
. (18)
Equating the first-order condition with respect to s to zero gives the socially optimal public
transportation fare, sopt:
sopt =
3t + 2k − c
3
. (19)
Equations (18) and (19) are the same, hence there are infinitely many (t, s) pairs that
satisfy the planner’s solution. This is partly due to the bilateral risk neutrality assumption.
Here, the main concern of the social planner is to determine the socially optimal number
of shoppers coming by public transportation and to find (t, s) pairs that lead to this optimal
number. So, in all socially optimal solutions, N∗ =
√
(c + k)/3a individuals come by public
transportation and the social planner chooses one of the (t, s) pairs satisfying equation (18)
to achieve this outcome.
If I substitute t = 0 in equation (19), I will find that s = (2k − c)/3 and if I substitute
s = 0 in equation (18), I will find that t = (c − 2k)/3. Hence, the equilibrium (t, s) pairs,
namely (0, (2k − c)/3) when c ≤ 2k and ((c− 2k)/3, 0) when c > 2k, are two of the many
socially optimal pairs leading to the outcome that
√
(c + k)/3a individuals come by public
transportation.
Note that the socially optimal number of shoppers coming by public transportation is the
same as the equilibrium number of shoppers coming by public transportation. This result
does not imply that the social welfare in the equilibrium solution and the social welfare in
the socially optimal solution are the same. I am unable to calculate the price of the good
either explicitly or implicitly in the socially optimal solution and since I cannot calculate it, I
cannot find v˜ and the number of shoppers coming by car. Hence, I cannot make a comparison
between the welfare of society in the equilibrium solution and the welfare of society in the
socially optimal solution.
4 Extensions
The previous section derives the main results. In this robustness section, I extend the base
model in various ways and analyze whether the results change under different specifications
of the model. First, I consider a case in which public transportation is not an option to come
to the mall and the mall provides shuttle bus service. I find that total number of shoppers
coming to the mall, the modal split and the equation determining the equilibrium price of the
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good are the same as the ones found in Subsection 3.1, and the equations determining the
equilibrium parking fee and the equilibrium price of the shuttle bus are the same as the ones
found in Subsection 3.2. Then, I analyze a case in which transportation is provided privately
by a profit-maximizing transportation agency instead of by the government. In this case, the
equilibrium parking fees are still less than the marginal cost of providing parking spaces, the
equilibrium transportation fares are always positive, and the equilibrium number of shoppers
coming by privately provided transportation is lower than the equilibrium number of shoppers
coming by public transportation in Subsection 3.1. I, then, consider a case in which provision
of public transportation is costly for the government. I find that the equilibrium parking fees
are still less than the marginal cost of providing parking spaces, the equilibrium number of
shoppers coming by public transportation in this case is lower than the equilibrium number
of shoppers coming by public transportation in Subsection 3.1, and the profit of the mall in
this case is less than the profit of it in Subsection 3.1. Lastly, I analyze the base model with a
more general set of disutility functions and show that parking fee in an equilibrium is always
less than the marginal cost of providing parking spaces for this set of disutility functions.
4.1 The Mall Providing Shuttle Bus Service
Here, I consider a scenario in which there is not public transportation, but the mall provides
shuttle bus service. Let q denote the price of the shuttle bus to shoppers and d(N) represent
the disutility of shoppers coming by shuttle bus where d(N) = aN2, a is a positive constant.
In equilibrium, N∗ individuals come by shuttle bus where N∗ =
√
(t + k − q)/a. Then, the
problem of the mall is to maximize its profit, Πshuttle(P, t, q):
Πshuttle(P, t, q) = (P + q)N∗ + (P + t− c)[(1− F (v˜))Nˆ −N∗] , (20)
by choosing P, t and q. The first-order conditions with respect to P , t and q are
ΠshuttleP : (1− F (P + t + k + r))Nˆ − (P + t− c)f(P + t + k + r)Nˆ (21)
Πshuttlet : (1− F (P + t + k + r))Nˆ − (P + t− c)f(P + t + k + r)Nˆ
− t− c− q
2a
√
t+k−q
a
−
√
t + k − q
a
Πshuttleq :
t− c− q
2a
√
t+k−q
a
+
√
t + k − q
a
.
14
Equating the first-order condition with respect to P to zero implicitly gives the equilibrium
price of the good, P shuttleeq :
P shuttleeq =
1− F (v˜)
f(v˜)
− t + c . (22)
If I equate the first-order conditions with respect to P and t to zero, then I will have the
equilibrium parking fee, tshuttleeq :
tshuttleeq =
3q + c− 2k
3
. (23)
If I equate the first-order condition with respect to q to zero, then I will have the equilibrium
price of the shuttle bus, qshuttleeq :
qshuttleeq =
3t + 2k − c
3
. (24)
Equations (23) and (24) imply that there are infinitely many (t, q) pairs from which the
mall can choose. In equilibrium, N∗ =
√
(c + k)/3a individuals come by shuttle bus and the
mall providing shuttle bus service chooses one of the various (t, q) pairs satisfying equation
(23) to reach this equilibrium solution. Notice that this solution is a mixture of the equilibrium
solution and the socially optimal solution in Section 3. Equation (22), which is the equation
determining the equilibrium price of the good, the number of shoppers coming by car, the
number of shoppers coming by the alternative mode, and the number of individuals staying
at home are the same as the equilibrium solution in the base model in Subsection 3.1; the
(t, q) pairs the mall can choose given by equations (23) or (24) are the same as the (t, s) pairs
the social planner can choose in the socially optimal solution in the base model in Subsection
3.2.
4.2 Private Provision of Transportation
I now consider a scenario in which transportation is provided privately by a transportation
agency that only cares about its own profits. This service has similar properties with public
transportation provided by the government. Let s denote the private transportation fare and
d(N) represent the disutility of shoppers coming by transportation provided privately where
d(N) = aN2, a is a positive constant. In equilibrium, N∗ individuals come by transportation
provided privately where N∗ =
√
(t + k − s)/a. The problem of the mall in this case is the
same as the problem of the mall in Subsubsection 3.1.2 and the parking fee in this case is the
same as the parking fee in equation (5), which is t = (c + 2s− 2k)/3. Then, the problem of
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the private transportation agency is to maximize its own profits, X:
X = sN∗ , (25)
by choosing s. The first-order condition with respect to s is
Xs :
√
t + k − s
a
− s
2a
√
t+k−s
a
. (26)
By equating this first-order condition to zero, I get
s =
2t + 2k
3
. (27)
If the parking fee chosen by the mall is positive, simultaneously solving equation (5) and
equation (27) yields the equilibrium parking fee, tprivateeq case1, and the equilibrium transportation
fare under private provision of transportation, sprivateeq case1:
tprivateeq case1 =
3c− 2k
5
. (28)
sprivateeq case1 =
2c + 2k
5
. (29)
Notice that tprivateeq case1 in equation (28) is positive if and only if 3c > 2k and it is always less than
the marginal cost of providing parking spaces. If the mall chooses free provision of parking,
equation (27) will result in the equilibrium transportation fare, sprivateeq case2:
sprivateeq case2 =
2k
3
, (30)
and this case will occur if and only if 3c ≤ 2k. The following propositions summarize these
findings.
Proposition 2 When transportation is provided privately, the equilibrium transportation fares
are always positive and they are greater than the equilibrium public transportation fares in
the base model. Moreover, the equilibrium parking fees are always less than the marginal
cost of providing parking spaces.
The equilibrium transportation fares should be positive; otherwise profit-maximizing
transportation agency will not provide transportation. The agency chooses equilibrium trans-
portation fares such that they are greater than the equilibrium public transportation fares in
the base model since it is only interested in its own profits, not the total welfare of all mem-
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bers in society. In equilibrium, the mall still chooses parking fees which are less than the
marginal cost of providing parking spaces. Hence, it uses parking as a loss leader in order to
charge higher prices for the good sold and maximize its profits.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium number of shoppers coming by transportation provided pri-
vately (N∗ =
√
(c + k)/5a if t > 0 and N∗ =
√
k/3a if t = 0) is lower than the equilibrium
number of shoppers coming by public transportation in the base model. Furthermore, the
equilibrium profit of the mall under private provision of transportation is less than the equi-
librium profit of the mall in the base model for all positive values of c and k.6
When transportation is provided privately, the equilibrium transportation fares are greater
than the ones found in the base model and the equilibrium parking fees are greater than
or equal to the ones found in the base model. Moreover, the increase in the equilibrium
transportation fares is more than the increase in the equilibrium parking fees and this implies
that the equilibrium number of shoppers coming by privately provided transportation will be
lower than the equilibrium number of shoppers coming by public transportation in the base
model.
The number of shoppers coming to the mall in this case is the same as the number of
shoppers coming to the mall in the base model. This information combined with the fact that
the equilibrium parking fees in this case are greater than or equal to the equilibrium parking
fees in the base model implies that the price of the good in this case will be less than or
equal to the one in the base model. This fact and the fact that the equilibrium parking fees
are less than the marginal cost of providing parking spaces lead to the following conclusion:
The equilibrium profit of the mall under private provision of transportation is less than the
equilibrium profit of the mall in the base model.
4.3 Costly Provision of Public Transportation
I now consider a scenario in which provision of public transportation is costly for the gov-
ernment. I show that adding this cost into the base model changes none of my main results
qualitatively and hence its exclusion from the model is just a valid simplifying assumption.7
The problem of the individuals is the same as the problem solved in Subsubsection 3.1.1 and
the problem of the mall is the same as the problem solved in Subsubsection 3.1.2. However,
the problem of the government is different and I analyze it as two separate cases.
6See Appendix A.4 for calculations.
7For simplicity, I assume constant public transportation cost per passenger. However, this assumption may
not reflect reality since high fixed costs of providing public transportation may lead a decline in per passenger
cost as the number of shoppers choosing public transportation increases.
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Case 1: s determined by the government results in a t such that t ≤ 0 and the mall
chooses t = 0 and P = [1 − F (v˜)]/f(v˜) + c. Then, the problem of the government is to
maximize the welfare of society, Y case1 cPT :
Y case1 cPT = rNˆF (v˜) + [(
∫ v¯
v˜
vf(v)dv)− 1− F (v˜)
f(v˜)
− c− k][Nˆ − NˆF (v˜)] (31)
+ (
1− F (v˜)
f(v˜)
+ c)
√
k − s
a
+
1− F (v˜)
f(v˜)
[(1− F (v˜))Nˆ −
√
k − s
a
]
+ (s− cPT )
√
k − s
a
,
by choosing s, where cPT > 0 denotes the marginal cost of providing public transporta-
tion. Equating the first-order condition with respect to s to zero results in the equilibrium
transportation fare, scPTeq case1:
scPTeq case1 =
2k − c + cPT
3
≥ 0 . (32)
Case 2: s determined by the government results in a t such that t > 0 and the mall
chooses t = (c+ 2s− 2k)/3 and P = [1−F (v˜)]/f(v˜) + 2(c+ k− s)/3. Then, the problem
of the government is to maximize the welfare of society, Y case2 cPT :
Y case2 cPT = rNˆF (v˜) + [(
∫ v¯
v˜
vf(v)dv)− 1− F (v˜)
f(v˜)
− c− k][Nˆ − NˆF (v˜)] (33)
+ [
1− F (v˜)
f(v˜)
+
2(c + k − s)
3
]
√
c + k − s
3a
+
1− F (v˜)
f(v˜)
[(1− F (v˜))Nˆ −
√
c + k − s
3a
] + (s− cPT )
√
c + k − s
3a
,
by choosing s. Equating the first-order condition with respect to s to zero results in the
equilibrium transportation fare, scPTeq case2:
scPTeq case2 = cPT . (34)
So far, I have analyzed case 1 and case 2. Now, I need to compare Y case1 cPT and
Y case2 cPT in order to understand which of these cases is superior in terms of welfare. By
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substituting the relevant prices, parking fees and transportation fares, I find that
Y case1 cPT = y +
2c + 2k − 2cPT
3
√
c + k − cPT
3a
(35)
Y case2 cPT = y +
2c + 2k − 2cPT
3
√
c + k − cPT
3a
,
where y = rNˆF (v˜) + [(
∫ v¯
v˜
vf(v)dv) − (1 − F (v˜))/f(v˜) − c − k][Nˆ − NˆF (v˜)] + [(1 −
F (v˜))2Nˆ ]/f(v˜) and v˜ = [1 − F (v˜)]/f(v˜) + c + k + r. This comparison shows that the
welfare of society in the first case is equal to the welfare of society in the second case, hence
the government is indifferent between choosing the equilibrium public transportation fare
which leads to case 1 and the one which leads to case 2.
Notice that which of the above equilibria occurs depends on the model parameters. If
c + 2cPT ≤ 2k, then the first case will occur, i.e., the government chooses a non-negative
transportation fare and the mall prefers free provision of parking. If c + 2cPT > 2k, the
second case will occur, i.e., the government provides transportation at its marginal cost and
the mall chooses tcPTeq case2 = (c − 2k + 2cPT )/3 > 0. I summarize these findings in the
following proposition.
Proposition 4 The equilibrium number of shoppers coming by public transportation under
costly provision of transportation by the government,
√
(c + k − cPT )/3a, is lower than the
equilibrium number of shoppers coming by public transportation in the base model. More-
over, as expected, the equilibrium profit of the mall in the costly provision of public trans-
portation by the government case is less than the equilibrium profit of the mall in the base
model for all positive values of c and k.8
The equilibrium transportation fares under costly provision of public transportation are
greater than the ones found in the base model and the equilibrium parking fees are greater
than or equal to the ones found in the base model. Moreover, the increase in the equilibrium
transportation fares is more than the increase in the equilibrium parking fees and this implies
that the equilibrium number of shoppers coming by public transportation under costly pro-
vision of transportation will be lower than the equilibrium number of shoppers coming by
public transportation in the base model.
The number of shoppers coming to the mall in this case is the same as the number of
shoppers coming to the mall in the base model. This information combined with the fact that
the equilibrium parking fees in this case are greater than or equal to the equilibrium parking
fees in the base model implies that the price of the good in this case will be less than or equal
8See Appendix A.5 for calculations.
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to the one in the base model. This fact and the fact that the equilibrium parking fees are
less than the marginal cost of providing parking spaces lead to the following conclusion: The
equilibrium profit of the mall under costly provision of public transportation is less than the
equilibrium profit of the mall in the base model.
The next step is to analyze the social planner’s problem when provision of public trans-
portation by the government is costly. The problem of the social planner is to maximize the
welfare of society, Y cPT (P, t, s) :
Y cPT (P, t, s) = rNˆF (v˜) + [(
∫ v¯
v˜
vf(v)dv)− P − t− k][Nˆ − NˆF (v˜)] (36)
+ P
√
t + k − s
a
+ (P + t− c)[(1− F (v˜))Nˆ −
√
t + k − s
a
]
+ (s− cPT )
√
t + k − s
a
,
by choosing P, t and s. The first-order conditions with respect to P, t and s are
Y cPTP : Nˆf(v˜)[r −
∫ v¯
v˜
vf(v)dv + k + c]− [Nˆ − NˆF (v˜)]f(v˜)v˜ (37)
Y cPTt : Nˆf(v˜)[r −
∫ v¯
v˜
vf(v)dv + k + c]− [Nˆ − NˆF (v˜)]f(v˜)v˜
− t− c− s + cPT
2a
√
t+k−s
a
−
√
t + k − s
a
Y cPTs :
t− c− s + cPT
2a
√
t+k−s
a
+
√
t + k − s
a
.
Equating the first-order conditions with respect to P and t to zero yields the socially optimal
parking fee, tcPTopt :
tcPTopt =
3s + c− 2k − cPT
3
. (38)
Equating the first-order condition with respect to s to zero yields the socially optimal trans-
portation fare, scPTopt :
scPTopt =
3t + 2k − c + cPT
3
. (39)
Equation (38) and equation (39) imply that there are infinitely many (t, s) pairs which
lead to the socially optimal solution in which N∗ =
√
(k + c− cPT )/3a individuals come
by public transportation. Hence, the socially optimal number of shoppers coming by public
transportation when provision of transportation by the government is costly is lower than the
20
socially optimal number of shoppers coming by public transportation in Subsection 3.2.
4.4 Generalization of Disutility Function
Up to this point, I have assumed a specific functional form for disutility function, namely
d(N) = aN2. In this subsection, I go beyond this assumption and consider a scenario in
which d(N) : (0,∞)→ (0,∞) is an increasing and differentiable function. I want to investi-
gate if my results are due to the specific functional form of disutility function I have assumed
in the base model or if they are generalizable to the set of increasing and differentiable posi-
tive functions.
The problem of the individuals is the same as the problem in Subsubsection 3.1.1, and in
equilibrium N∗ individuals come by public transportation, where N∗ = d−1(t + k − s). The
problem of the mall is to maximize its profit, Πgen(P, t):
Πgen(P, t) = PN∗ + (P + t− c)[(1− F (v˜))Nˆ −N∗] , (40)
by choosing P and t. The first-order conditions with respect to P and t are
ΠgenP : (1− F (P + t + k + r))Nˆ − (P + t− c)f(P + t + k + r)Nˆ (41)
Πgent : (1− F (P + t + k + r))Nˆ − (P + t− c)f(P + t + k + r)Nˆ
− t− c
d′(d−1(t + k − s)) − d
−1(t + k − s) .
If both first-order conditions are zero, then I will have
t− c
d′(d−1(t + k − s)) + d
−1(t + k − s) = 0 . (42)
Rearranging equation (42) leads to
c− t = d′(d−1(t + k − s))d−1(t + k − s) . (43)
Since the inverse of an increasing function is also increasing, the derivative of an in-
creasing function is non-negative, and the inverse of d(N) is positive; the right-hand side of
equation (43) is non-negative, which in turn requires the left-hand side of the equation to be
non-negative and implies t ≤ c. This finding leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 5 For positive, increasing and differentiable disutility functions, the equilibrium
parking fees are always less than the marginal cost of providing parking spaces.
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In this robustness section, I analyze whether the results of the base model change under
different specifications. I find that the equilibrium parking fees found in the base model are
two of the many equilibrium parking fees when the mall provides shuttle bus service. When
transportation is privately provided by a profit-maximizing transportation agency or when
provision of public transportation is costly for the government, the equilibrium parking fees
are still less than the marginal cost of providing parking spaces. This result also holds for a
general set of disutility functions.
5 Related Literature on Bundling and Loss Leaders
The mall can be thought as selling the good alone to the shoppers coming by public trans-
portation and selling the good bundled with parking spaces to the shoppers coming by car.
Hence, in this section I analyze the relation between my paper and the bundling literature.
United States v. Loew’s, Inc: A Note on Block Booking (Stigler, 1963) is the first paper that
implicitly examines the practice of bundling. Stigler argues that block booking is a price
discrimination technique by which one can sort customers into different groups according to
their reservation prices and extract consumer surplus. By using the same argument and the
same framework as Stigler, Adams and Yellen (1976) show that the commodity bundling can
be profitable for a monopolist even in the absence of cost considerations and complementar-
ity of bundle components. They coin the term ”mixed bundling” for the practice of selling
the same commodities both separately and in packages. Furthermore, they state that ”com-
modity bundles sometimes include goods that cannot be sold separately in the market place”,
and give the example of an automobile as a package of transportation services and luxury
since luxury cannot be sold separately in the market. In line with the definitions and concepts
introduced in Adams and Yellen, the mall in my paper can be thought as implicitly employ-
ing mixed bundling practices in which the good is sold either alone or bundled with parking.
Notice that the mall in my paper does not sell parking spaces separately in the market.
In Adams and Yellen, the two products are independently valued products, i.e., they are
neither substitutes nor complements. Lewbel (1985) generalizes the paper of Adams and
Yellen to the cases in which customers may perceive commodities as complements or sub-
stitutes, including the cases in which commodities are substitutes for some customers and
complements for the others. Lewbel analyzes each case graphically and then concludes that
bundling does not require complementarity of the goods to be profitable and complemen-
tarity of the goods is not a sufficient condition for bundling to be profitable. Telser (1979)
in A theory of monopoly of complementary goods shows that a monopolist can increase his
profits by selling complementary goods in groups to different kinds of shoppers. Venkatesh
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and Kamakura (2003) in Optimal bundling and pricing under a monopoly analyze optimal
solutions for complements and substitutes and show how marginal costs play an important
role in determining the optimal strategy. In my paper, parking spaces and the good sold by
the mall can be thought as complements since when the price of the good increases, ceteris
paribus, the demand for parking, (1−F (vˆ))Nˆ −N∗, will decrease and when the parking fee
increases, ceteris paribus, the demand for the good, (1 − F (vˆ))Nˆ , will decrease. In fact, in
my model, parking spaces and the good are perfect complements for the shoppers coming to
the mall by car and they are independent goods for the shoppers coming to the mall by public
transportation. The value of parking spaces for the shoppers coming by public transportation
is zero.
In the base model and also in nearly all modifications of the base model, the mall chooses
equilibrium parking fees which are less than the marginal cost of providing parking spaces.
This result implies that the mall uses parking as a loss leader. Hence, my paper relates to the
loss leader literature. Telser (1979) states that the sale of one or more complementary goods
at prices below the marginal costs may be profitable for the seller as long as the seller has
the monopoly power over all complementary products and is unable to sell them in different
packages to different groups of shoppers. Telser also comments on one of the most common
features of loss leader products, namely the commodity sold at a price below its marginal
cost is sold earlier than the other commodity, and the desire to explain the success of the loss
leader strategy based on this feature. He states that the success of the loss leader strategy does
not depend on mistaken customer expectations, but depends on the assumption that the seller
cannot perfectly price discriminate. In my model, the mall has a monopoly over the good and
parking spaces and it does not charge different prices for different customer groups. It offers
the good at the same price to both groups, hence it does not perfectly price discriminate. So,
the explanation offered by Telser (1979) totally fits my model.
Hess and Gerstner (1987) interpret the loss leader pricing as a bundling strategy in which
retailers bundle impulse goods, the goods on which the retailers have monopoly power, with
leader products, the products priced below their costs to attract customers to the retail stores.
Lal and Matutes (1989) claim that one reason for which firms employ the loss leader strat-
egy is related to satisfying the needs of heterogeneous customers in a perfect information
duopoly setting. Lal and Matutes (1994) consider an economy in which every customer has
the same willingness to pay for the products and find that the interplay between rational ex-
pectations, multi-product competition and imperfect information of customers about prices
may lead to an equilibrium in which retailers offer loss leaders to attract more customers.
They also conclude that the goods with lower reservation prices and the goods bought more
frequently are offered as loss leaders. DeGraba (2006) takes an approach different from the
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papers discussed above. He claims that goods should be priced as loss leaders if the group of
customers buying these goods is more profitable than the group of customers who does not
buy them. DeGraba also opposes the idea of classifying the most frequently bought goods as
loss leaders.
The imperfect information explanation offered by Lal and Matutes (1994) and most of
the papers in the loss leader literature is not relevant to my paper since the individuals in
my model are aware of the price of the good and the parking fee in advance. Moreover,
most papers in the loss leader literature analyze competitive environments in which at least
two retailers compete for customers whereas the mall in my paper has a monopoly power.
However, the individuals’ having the outside option of staying at home adds a competitive
flavor into the model. Offering parking spaces as loss leaders enables the mall to increase
the price of the good without changing the full price and the total number of shoppers, and
consequently increase the profits of the mall.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I construct a model of shopping mall parking, in which shoppers have two
alternative modes (car and public transportation) by which they come to the mall. The mall
provides parking spaces for those who come by car. I show that in equilibrium, the mall
charges parking fees less than the marginal cost of providing parking spaces, so it embeds
some proportion of the cost of providing parking spaces into the price of the good. Hence,
in a sense the mall employs a kind of mixed bundling practice and uses parking as a loss
leader. Moreover, this equilibrium result of charging parking fees less than the marginal
cost of providing parking spaces is one of the socially optimal solutions and robust to the
extensions of the model.
In my model, parking lot size is exogenous for simplicity. In reality, it is a choice variable
and should be endogenously dealed with. Some papers in the parking literature, including
Voith (1998), Arnott and Inci (2006), Anderson and dePalma (2007) and Hasker and Inci
(2012) discuss endogenous land use. So, an extension of my model may analyze a case in
which the demand for the good varies and the mall determines parking lot size as well as the
price of the good and the parking fee.
Another extension of my model may deal with the traffic congestion externality. In my
model, k represents the fuel cost of shoppers coming by car and it is constant. Modeling
k as a function of shoppers coming by car is one way of including traffic congestion into
the model. Traffic congestion is an important component of the parking literature and many
papers such as Arnott and Yan (2000) and Kraus (2003) incorporate it in their models. So,
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adding traffic congestion externality to the model would be worthy and the effects of this
modification on the equilibrium and socially optimal solutions should be analyzed.
In my model, mode choice of shoppers is independent from the value of the good. In other
words, the shoppers may come by car or public transportation regardless of their valuation
of the good. An alternative version of this model can be the one in which valuations of the
individuals are somehow linked to their mode choice decisions. Analyzing the equilibrium
and socially optimal solutions in such a setting may be a fruitful topic for future research.
A further extension of my paper can be to model the shopping mall as a monopoly plat-
form of two-sided markets. Rochet and Tirole (2003) develop a model which mainly deals
with usage externalities of two-sided markets. They analyze the model as an illustration of
the payment card industry, but it is applicable to more general situations. They give some
examples of two-sided markets and the shopping mall case is one of these examples. In this
context, a mall can be modeled as a two-sided platform which serves both shoppers by pro-
viding parking spaces and shops by providing shopping spaces. Furthermore, Rochet and
Tirole (2006) state that the price structure in a two-sided market is very important for many
economists, private and public decision makers. For this reason, managers sometimes prefer
using one side of the market as a loss leader. Then, the authors analyze under what conditions
the price structure really matters.
All in all, this paper is an important step to better understand the shopping mall parking
behavior, but further research is needed in order to grasp the big picture.
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A Appendix
Appendix A.1
If s and t are determined such that t + k < s + d(N) for all N , then all shoppers will come
by car. In this case, the problem of the mall is to maximize
Π(P, t) = (P + t− c)(1− F (v˜))Nˆ , (A-1)
by choosing P and t, where v˜ = P + t + k + r. The first-order conditions with respect to P
and t are
ΠP : (1− F (P + t + k + r))Nˆ − (P + t− c)f(P + t + k + r)Nˆ (A-2)
Πt : (1− F (P + t + k + r))Nˆ − (P + t− c)f(P + t + k + r)Nˆ .
These two conditions are the same and equating them to zero gives
P + t =
1− F (v˜)
f(v˜)
+ c . (A-3)
Hence, P and t cannot be uniquely determined in this case. This solution is the same as the
solution of Hasker and Inci (2012) model in the absence of insurance motive.
If s and t are determined such that t + k > s + d(N) for all N , then all shoppers will
come by public transportation. This result in turn implies that the mall will not choose t since
nobody comes by car. Then, the problem of the mall is to maximize
Π(P ) = P (1− F (v˜))Nˆ , (A-4)
by choosing P , where v˜ = P + s + d((1 − F (v˜))Nˆ) + r. The first-order condition with
respect to P is
ΠP : (1− F (v˜))Nˆ − Pf(v˜)Nˆ ∂v˜
∂P
. (A-5)
Notice that H(v˜, P ) = v˜ − P − s − d((1 − F (v˜))Nˆ) − r = 0 defines an implicit function.
By using the implicit function theorem, I get
ΠP : (1− F (v˜))Nˆ − Pf(v˜)Nˆ
1 + d′((1− F (v˜))Nˆ)f(v˜)Nˆ . (A-6)
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By equating equation (A-6) to zero, the price of the good is implicitly defined as
P =
(1− F (v˜))[1 + d′((1− F (v˜))Nˆ)f(v˜)Nˆ ]
f(v˜)
. (A-7)
Appendix A.2
To verify that the equilibrium price of the good determined by equation (3) and the equilib-
rium parking fee determined by equation (5) are maximizers, I form the Hessian matrix and
check for its negative definiteness. To form Hessian, I derive the second-order conditions of
the maximization problem of the mall which are
ΠPP : −2f(P + t + k + r)Nˆ − f p(P + t + k + r)Nˆ(P + t− c) (A-8)
ΠPt : −2f(P + t + k + r)Nˆ − f p(P + t + k + r)Nˆ(P + t− c)
ΠtP : −2f(P + t + k + r)Nˆ − f p(P + t + k + r)Nˆ(P + t− c)
Πtt : − 3t + 4k − 4s + c
2
√
a(t + k − s)(2t + 2k − 2s) − 2f(P + t + k + r)Nˆ
− f p(P + t + k + r)Nˆ(P + t− c) .
First, I need to determine the sign of −2f(v˜)Nˆ − f p(v˜)Nˆ(P + t − c). By replacing
P and t with their values found in equations (3) and (5) respectively, I get −2f(v˜)Nˆ −
f p(v˜)Nˆ(1 − F (v˜))/f(v˜). From the monotone hazard rate property discussed in Section 3,
I know that [f 2(v˜) + f p(v˜)(1 − F (v˜))]/[1 − F (v˜)]2 > 0. If I multiply this expression by
Nˆ [1 − F (v˜)]2/f(v˜), I will have f(v˜)Nˆ + f p(v˜)Nˆ(1 − F (v˜))/f(v˜) > 0 which implies that
2f(v˜)Nˆ + f p(v˜)Nˆ(1 − F (v˜))/f(v˜) > 0 since the probability density function is always
non-negative. Hence, −2f(v˜)Nˆ − f p(v˜)Nˆ(1− F (v˜))/f(v˜) < 0.
Then, I need to determine the sign of−(3t+4k−4s+c)/[2√a(t + k − s)(2t+2k−2s)].
By replacing t with its value found in equation (5), I have −3/(2√a(t + k − s)), which is
negative. The resulting Hessian matrix evaluated at Peq and teq is−2f(v˜)Nˆ − f p(v˜)Nˆ 1−F (v˜)f(v˜) −2f(v˜)Nˆ − f p(v˜)Nˆ 1−F (v˜)f(v˜)−2f(v˜)Nˆ − f p(v˜)Nˆ 1−F (v˜)
f(v˜)
− 3
2
√
a(t+k−s) − 2f(v˜)Nˆ − f
p(v˜)Nˆ 1−F (v˜)
f(v˜)

and it is negative-definite. This negative-definiteness implies that Peq and teq are local maxi-
mizers for the mall.
Notice that there is only one critical (P, t) pair and it is a local maximizer. Hence, either
(Peq, teq) pair is the global maximizer and the problem of the mall has an interior solution or
the global maximum lies on the boundaries.
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Appendix A.3
To show that the equilibrium transportation fare found in case 1 in Subsubsection 3.1.3 is the
global maximum, I need to look at the second derivative of Y case1 which is
Y case1ss : −
4k − 3s + c
4a(k − s)
√
k−s
a
. (A-9)
By rearranging this derivative, I have−[(3/(4a√(k − s)/a))+((k+c)/(4a(k−s)√(k − s)/a))],
which is negative. So, Y case1ss is always negative which implies that seq case1 = (2k − c)/3
is the only critical point. Since it is the only critical point, it is the global maximum of the
problem of the government in case 1 in Subsubsection 3.1.3.
Similarly, to show that the equilibrium transportation fare found in case 2 in Subsubsec-
tion 3.1.3 is the global maximum, I need to look at the second derivative of Y case2 which
is
Y case2ss : −
2c + 2k − s
36a(c + k − s)
√
c+k−s
3a
. (A-10)
By rearranging this derivative, I have −[(1/(36a√(c + k − s)/3a)) + ((k + c)/(36a(c +
k − s)√(c + k − s)/3a))], which is negative. So, Y case2ss is always negative which implies
that seq case2 = 0 is the only critical point. Since it is the only critical point, it is the global
maximum of the problem of the government in case 2 in Subsubsection 3.1.3.
Appendix A.4
To prove that the equilibrium profit of the mall under private provision of transportation,
Πprivate, is less than the equilibrium profit of the mall in the base model, Π, for all positive
values of c and k; I analyze three cases.
If 2k ≥ 3c, then the mall will choose free provision of parking spaces in both cases. The
resulting profits are
Π =
[1− F (v˜)]2Nˆ
f(v˜)
+ c
√
c + k
3a
(A-11)
Πprivate =
[1− F (v˜)]2Nˆ
f(v˜)
+ c
√
k
3a
,
where v˜ = [1−F (v˜)]/f(v˜)+c+k+r. So, the equilibrium profit of the mall in the base model
is greater than the equilibrium profit of the mall under private provision of transportation.
If c ≤ 2k < 3c, then the mall in the base model will choose free provision of parking
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spaces, but the mall in the private provision of transportation case will choose a positive
parking fee, t = (3c− 2k)/5. The resulting profits are
Π =
[1− F (v˜)]2Nˆ
f(v˜)
+ c
√
c + k
3a
(A-12)
Πprivate =
[1− F (v˜)]2Nˆ
f(v˜)
+
2c + 2k
5
√
c + k
5a
,
where v˜ = [1 − F (v˜)]/f(v˜) + c + k + r. Since 2k < 3c implies (2c + 2k)/5 < c, and√
(c + k)/5a <
√
(c + k)/3a; the equilibrium profit of the mall in the base model is greater
than the equilibrium profit of the mall under private provision of transportation.
If 2k < c, then the mall will choose positive parking fees in both cases. The resulting
profits are
Π =
[1− F (v˜)]2Nˆ
f(v˜)
+
2c + 2k
3
√
c + k
3a
(A-13)
Πprivate =
[1− F (v˜)]2Nˆ
f(v˜)
+
2c + 2k
5
√
c + k
5a
,
where v˜ = [1−F (v˜)]/f(v˜)+c+k+r. So, the equilibrium profit of the mall in the base model
is greater than the equilibrium profit of the mall under private provision of transportation.
Appendix A.5
To prove that the equilibrium profit of the mall in the costly provision of transportation by
the government case, ΠcPT , is less than the equilibrium profit of the mall in the base model,
Π, for all positive values of c and k; I analyze three cases.
If 2k ≥ c+2cPT , then the mall will choose free provision of parking spaces in both cases.
The resulting profits are
Π =
[1− F (v˜)]2Nˆ
f(v˜)
+ c
√
c + k
3a
(A-14)
ΠcPT =
[1− F (v˜)]2Nˆ
f(v˜)
+ c
√
c + k − cPT
3a
,
where v˜ = [1−F (v˜)]/f(v˜)+c+k+r. So, the equilibrium profit of the mall in the base model
is greater than the equilibrium profit of the mall when provision of public transportation by
the government is costly.
If c ≤ 2k < c + 2cPT , then the mall in the base model will choose free provision of
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parking spaces, but the mall in the costly provision of public transportation case will choose
a positive parking fee, t = (c− 2k + 2cPT )/3. The resulting profits are
Π =
[1− F (v˜)]2Nˆ
f(v˜)
+ c
√
c + k
3a
(A-15)
ΠcPT =
[1− F (v˜)]2Nˆ
f(v˜)
+
2c + 2k − 2cPT
3
√
c + k − cPT
3a
,
where v˜ = [1−F (v˜)]/f(v˜)+c+k+r. Since 2k < c+2cPT implies (2c+2k−2cPT )/3 < c,
and
√
(c + k − cPT )/3a <
√
(c + k)/3a; the equilibrium profit of the mall in the base model
is greater than the equilibrium profit of the mall when provision of public transportation by
the government is costly.
If 2k < c, then the mall will choose positive parking fees in both cases. The resulting
profits are
Π =
[1− F (v˜)]2Nˆ
f(v˜)
+
2c + 2k
3
√
c + k
3a
(A-16)
ΠcPT =
[1− F (v˜)]2Nˆ
f(v˜)
+
2c + 2k − 2cPT
3
√
c + k − cPT
3a
,
where v˜ = [1−F (v˜)]/f(v˜)+c+k+r. So, the equilibrium profit of the mall in the base model
is greater than the equilibrium profit of the mall when provision of public transportation by
the government is costly.
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